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TESTAMENTARY INTENT

PROCEDURAL DETERMINATION OF TESTAMENTARY
INTENT IN PENNSYLVANIA
By
A. J. WHITE

HUTTON*

A will is defined by our courts as the legal declaration of one's intentions to
be carried out after the declarant's death.' No wills statute in this commonwealth has either defined a will or prescribed any form for the same. Therefore,
any person, of the required age, is enabled to draw his will or that of another and
in any words, provided the instrument as v.ritten conforms to the above general
definition. 2 With this legal looseness, it is not strange that our reports teem with
cases, odd and unique as to fact and form, wherein the courts struggle to reach
a just conclusion whether the particular paper constitutes, in the sonorous phrase
of the law, "a testamentary disposition."
The Kauffman case8 is probably the latest in which the determination of testamentary intent has come before the supreme court and wherein per curiam the
decree of the Orphans' Court of York County was affirmed "on the comprehensive opinion of President Judge Gross."
A review of this case and discussion of other authorities pertinent may aid,
it is hoped, those interested in the process of determining testamentary intent
and just where "the two witness" rule fits into the exercise of the judicial function as a part of the determination. In the instant case the decedent, an unmarried
woman, died May 22, 1949 at the age of eighty-seven years. Letters of administration were issued by the register on May 26, 1949, but on September 23, 1949, a
son by a former marriage, presented his petition to the register for the probate
of an undated instrument in writing as the decedent's will reading as follows:
"dear bill
i want you to have farm
Annie Kauffman."
The register refused to admit the paper to probate on the ground that it was not
testamentary in character. From this decision the proponent appealed to the orphans'
court. On petition of the proponent, a citation was issued and directed to be
*A.B., Gettysburg; A.M., Gettysburg; LL.B., Harvard; LL.D., Gettysburg; Professor of Law,
Dickinson School of Law; former Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Author of
HUTTON ON WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA; Member of Pennsylvania and Franklin County
Bar Associations; Member of Advisory Committee, Law of Decedents' Estates and Trusts, Joint
State Government Commission of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
1 Re Kauffman's Estate, 365 Pa. 555, 76 A.2d 414 (1950); Lewis' Estate, 139 Pa. Super. 83, 11
A.2d 83 (1940); Reynolds v. Maust, 142 Pa. Super. 109, 15 A.2d 853 (1940).
2 Hutton, Testamentary Cbaracter and Intent, 48 DICK. L. Rav. 22 (1943).
a

See note 1.
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served upon all the heirs at law and next of kin of decedent. Eventually it was
stipulated by all the parties in interest that the court decide whether an issue d.v.n.
be awarded and if so that the court should also decide the issue without the
aid of a jury. 4 The position of contestants was that the paper purported to be
no more than a letter and did not show testamentary intent. An additional position was that extrinsic evidence to show testamentary intent is not admissible.
Lastly, that if such evidence is admissible, the "two witness rule" is applicable. The
learned court in an elaborate series of findings of fact and an application of the
principles of law concluded the paper was of testamentary character legally proved and was entitled to probate and directed the register accordingly. It was observed that the problem involved was solely of probate and therefore no matters
of distribution or construction of will were relevant. 6
Legal Declaration Of Intentions
Adhering to the definition of a will, the question recurs what is the meaning
of the particular combination of words and who is the arbiter of that meaning?
Judge Gross answers the query succinctly:
"In all cases of this kind where a paper is proposed for probate
and its testamentary character is denied, it becomes the duty of the court
in the first instance to examine the paper, its form and its language, and
therefrom determine as a matter of law whether or not it shows testamentary intent with reasonable certainty. If testamentary intent is satisfactorily revealed from such examination by the court, the paper should
be probated as a will."
A few cases will illustrate the operations of the judicial function as just
outlined.
In Sullivan's Estate6 a model of brevity, clarity and terseness, howbeit with
little regard for book spelling, the testator directed:
"March the 4 Will my properti to my wief my death
John Sullivan."
The writing is beyond doubt testamentary. The words "my death" could have
been omitted. The significant word remaining is "Will," a technical expression
with a meaning recognized as such in legal and lay parlance. 7 It was held this
paper was properly admitted to probate. To show the evolution in the judicial8
process of ascertaining and determining the meaning of words in Gaston's Estate
the words used by the writer of the paper were, "It is my wish." The word
"wish" in this sentence was pronounced as the equivalent of the word "will" and
4 That jury trial may be waived, see Probate of Willi in Penna., 54 DicK. L. REv. at page 409

(1950).
5 Re Rockett's Will, 348 Pa. 445, 35 A.2d 303 (1944).
6 130 Pa. 342, 18 A. 1120 (1889).
'7 See writer's discussion, Testamentary Characterand Intent, 48 DIcK. L. REv. at page 24 (1943).
8 188 Pa. 374, 41 A. 529 (1898).
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therefore testamentary by judicial fiat.9 In the oft cited Knox's Estate10 Mitchell,
J., a careful and exact reasoner, pronounced "clearly testamentary" a letter left by
the decedent, written in lead pencil and signed "Harriet." The phrases vmphasized
by the learned justice were "A few things I would love to have done" coupled
with the direction "Please have just my baptismal names on stones." Thus the
words "would love to have done" taken with the latter directory sentence meant
in the judicial mind, "I will to be done." In Hengen's Estate" a paper undated
was offered for probate as a codicil to a formal will, the latter dated July 20,
1935, and testatrix dying January 24, 1938, the words were:
"I want Mamie to have my House
544 George St.
M. L. Hengen."
It was held the language was testamentary. Thus, as it appears by the aforegoing
cases, the courts in a series of progressive steps have started with the word
"will" and then proceeded to "wish" as the equivalent of "will" and then "want"
as the same as "wish." Finally in the Knox case the phrase "I would love to have
done" is interpreted as meaning "I will to be done."
In Zell's Estate12 Linn, J. concluded:
"If the instrument is a legal declaration of Zell's intention directed to be performed after his death, it is a will."
The learned justice further declared that the testamentary character of the instrument being apparent on its face, it was the duty of the court to give it effect.'$
As was pointed out by Simpson, J., in Kimmel's Estate"4 the informal character of a paper is immaterial and by no means precludes the court from finding
testamentary intent. Many cases were cited of deeds, mortgages, letters, powers
of attorney, agreements, checks and notes in form but nevertheless held to be wills
owing to certain words or phrases therein indicating testamentary character.
It may be that the language of the paper does not show testamentary intent
and on this score Judge Gross in the Kauffman case observed:
"On the other hand, if, from such examination (that is by the Court)
the paper is shown not to be a testamentary disposition, but is shown
to be a document of another type, then it is not to be probated as a
will."
There are many cases in the reports illustrative of the court's action in declaring
testamentary intent to be lacking. An early case is that of Stein v. North15 where
0 Cf,. Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. 159 (1881), "My wish."

10 131 Pa. 220, 18 A. 1021 (1890).
11
12
1
14
16

359 Pa. 547, 12 A.2d 119 (1940).
329 Pa. 312, 198 A. 76 (1938), citing many cases.
Re Tranor's Estate, 324 Pa. 263, 188 A. 292 (1936).
278 Pa. 435, 123 A. 405 (1924). Here a crudely drawn letter
was held testamentary.
3 Yeftes 324 (1802).
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the facts were that an uncle in this country wrote to his nephew, living abroad,
promising if the nephew would come over here and prove obedient and follow his
directions the uncle would make the nephew heir of his whole estate. It was held
that the language used was not precise enough to operate, either as a will or
a contract. In Shields v. Irwin'6 one executed an instrument under seal declaring
that he was justly indebted to a certain person for personal services and that his
executors should pay to this person the sum of $1000.00. The instrument was
17
held to be an obligation and not a testamentary disposition.
In McCunis' Estate'8 the register admitted to probate a paper signed by the
decedent and reading as follows:
"I want you, E. A. Kerr, to look after my property and if I don't
sell it, I will sign it over to you fox taking care of me.'
The lower court dismissed an appeal from the register's action in admitting to
probate this paper but the supreme court reversed the decree and held the paper
non-testamentary.
Extrinsic Evidence
In Kauffman's Estate, Judge Gross admitted extrinsic evidence to show the
circumstances and conditions attendant upon the signing of the paper by the decedent, however the learned court made this pertinent observation:
"Under the authority of In Re Hengen's Estate, supra,19 which
we will discuss later, we might have been warranted in holding that,
upon proper proof of its execution by the decedent, the disputed paper
was prima facie the will of the decedent and thus have placedthe burden
of proving the absence of testamentary intent upon the contestants.
The proponent, however, chose to assume the burden of proving testamentary intent.''20
The aforegoing statement is sound in law and excellent in pointing out the
21
proponent.
It was in Kisecker's Estate22 that Judge Stewart, then of the 0. C. of Franklin County, delivered a classic opinion on testamentary intent, extrinsic evidence
and the-"two witness" rule. It has been our guide for over half a century. The
contested paper signed at the end thereof was as follows:
"I this day, the 18th of December, 1888, give all my property real
and personal to Ruthy D. Long and Vesta A. Long, but I am to have the
use of all so long as I live, and I to pay all the taxes and keep up repairs
16 3 Yeates 389 (1902).
17 Cf. Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. 170 (1875). See also Patterson v. English, 71 Pa. 454 (1872); Tyson's Estate, 336 Pa. 497, 9 A.2d 733 (1939).

18 263 Pa. 523, 109 A. 156 (1920), per Stewart, J.
19 See Note 11.
20 HUTTON ON WILLS, pp. 132, 178.
21 Cf. Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737 (1930).

22 190 Pa. 476, 42 A. 886 (1899) ; 48 DIcz. L. REv, 36 (1943).
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and after my death Ruthy D. Long and Vesta A. Long is to have full and
free use of all my property, for value received."
Said the learned court:
"Judged by the language alone, that is, allowing the paper to speak
for itself, either a present conveyance or a posthumous disposition may
have been intended. The paper is no more inconsistent with the one
than the other, while the terms used are ordinarily employed in conveyances of present interest, yet considered connectedly and as a whole
they seem to disclose a purpose that the instrument is not to take effect

until after the death of the maker. Were we shut off from all considerations other than those to be found in the paper itself, we would allow
this latter view to prevail as the expressed intention of the maker.
What little extrinsic evidence there is is only confirmatory of this conclusion, and there is no reason whatever why it may not be considered."

(Emphasis supplied by the present writer.)
In affirming the decree ordering the register to admit the paper to probate,
and dismissing the appeal the supreme court said per curiam:
"The paper in controversy was undoubtedly testamentary. It was
to take effect after the death of the testator. It was in writing signed
at the end thereof by the deceased. The opinion of the learned court
below covers every contention of the appellant so fully and so entirely
to our
satisfaction, that we affirm the decree for the reasons there stat3
ed."2
The Kisecker and Kauffman cases have general points of similarity as to
fact and reasoning. Furthermore, both are affirmations per curiam and sustain
the principle of judicial determination of the problem of what is a will. In Re Yentz'
Ehstate2 ' it was said by Maxey, J. concerning the admission of extrinsic evidence:
"As to the proof of attendant or txtrinsic circumstances when
there is a question of the nature of a paper, offered as testamentary, see
Page on Wills, 34d. Ed. Vol. 1, sec. 59, p. 137, and In Re Sunday's
Estate, 167 Pa. 30,
31 A. 363. See also Nllbush v. Fellbush, 216 pa.
26
141, 65 A. 28."
In Kisecker's Estate26 as already pointed out, it was held that extrinsic collateral evidence is always competent to show that a paper was written and executed
with testamentary intent. In referring to such evidence Judge Stewart made these
pertinent observations:
"Nothing short of a positive and unequivocal expression from the
maker herself could more strongly negative tht idea of an intention
to convey presently than the facts and circumstances disclosed in the
evidence. This paper was written and executed by the maker ten years
before her death. It was never delivered to any one, but remained to the
end in her exclusive possession, not that it. had been forgotten and was
overlooked, for, until four or five days before her death, she had kept
23 Mitchell, J. was at this time on the Supreme Bench; cf. his opinion in the same tenor in Knox's
Estate, 131 Pa. 220, 18 A. 1021

(1890).

24 345 Pa. 393, 29 A.2d 13 (1942).
25 For discussion of Pa. cases-Hur-roN ON WILLS, 174
28 See Note 22.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 55

it where she must frequently have seen it, and in the very place of all
others where one in her situation would be most likely to keep a will,
and least likely to keep a deed,-in her Bible. A very few days before
her death, she directed an attendant to read it aloud in her hearing, and
then to place it carefully away in some other place. To no one did she
speak of it as her will, yet having it read over to her within a few
days of her death, and then directing that it be put away in some safe
place, such circumstances point unmistakably to the conclusion that she
herself regarded it as a posthumous disposition of her property."
In Kauffman's Estale27 Judge Gross as he stated would have been legally
justified in ordering the probate of the disputed paper without extrinsic evidence
but in admitting the same so fully as appears, any lingering doubt as to intent
was dispelled. This result is in accord with the reasoning of the Kisecker case
over fifty years before.
Two Witness Rule

It was urged in the Kauffman case that the "two witness rule" as to wills was
applicable. This rule was stated by Gibson, J. over one hundred and twenty years
ago 28 and was epitomized in Orlady v. Orlady29 as follows:
"Proof of execution must be made by two witnesses, each of whom
must separately depose to all facts necessary to complete the chain of
evidence, so that no link in it may depend on the credibility of but one."
On the matter of the "two witness rule" Judge Stewart in the Kisecker case
observed:
"It is true that there are cases which recognize the doctrine that testamentary intent is an essential link in the chain of evidence necessary to
establish a will, and like any other essential fact must be established
by two witnesses. The cases of Scott's Est., supra, and Sundays Est., 167

Pa. 30, may be instanced. But an examination of these cases and all others
to like effect will show that this rule obtains only where no testamentary
intent is d'erivable from the instrument itself, indeed, only in cases
where the nature and form of the instrument are inconsistent with such
intent. Under such circumstances, where extrinsic evidence is relied upon
exclusively to show that the instrument was intended to operate as a will,
it is not difficult to understand why the statutory requirements are held
applicable. But where the form and language used are entirely inconsistent with such intent, under judicial construction, or the intent is fairly
derivable from a consideration of the entire instrument, the necessity
for two witnesses relates only to the formal execution of the paper. Where

an instrument is by its terms a disposition of property to take effect
after the maker's death, no evidence of publication or acknowledgment
on his part that it is a last will is required. If legal proof be furnished
of its execution, the law will presume that the maker signed it understandingly, and that he intended it to be his will."so
See Note 1.
28 HQck v. Hock, 6 S. & R. 47 (1830).
29 356 Pa. 369, 9 A.2d 559 (1939).
27

80 C. 11 Pa. Super. 293 (1809).
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At another place 3 the writer has discussed the cases concerning this rule
and its proper application, 32 giving a summary of the matter as follows: *
"The rule, therefore, deduced from the cases, concerning the two
witness requirement, is that it only applies when issues are granted by
tht court to determine questions of testamentary intent upon facts
presented to the jury. If the writing is doubtful and the extrinsic facts do
not clear this doubt to the satisfaction of the judge, the result may be
either that the chancellor could not conscionably support a verdict for
the writing as showing testamentary intent and therefore holding against
probate, or that a substantial dispute having arisen, a verdict either
way could be supported, in which case the issue would be granted. However, if as pointed out in Sunday's Estate, supra, the act is distictly non
testamentary and couched with strict technical propriety in the words of
contract, deed, note or other non-testamentary form, there is no place
for extrinsic evidence and to admit any is to violate the terms op the
Wills Act, specifying that 'every will shall be in writing.' On the other
hand if the doubt is dispelled by any extrinsic evidence to the satisfaction
of the court, the prayer for an issue will be denied and the paper ordered
admitted to probate."
In the Kauffman case Judge Gross declared:
"If, however, after considering the extrinsic evidence in connection with the propounded paper itself, the ambiguity has not been dispelled and the Court is still in doubt that the language of the propounded
paper is susceptible of but one meaning and that a verdict of a jury
would be sustained either in favor of or against the paper as a will,
an issue d.v.n. should be granted, unless waived and the final decision
lodged in the lap of 33the Court, as the parties have done, by stipulation,
in the instant case."
Conclusion
Under the probate procedure in Pennsylvania the first point of contact is
with the register of wills.3 4 It is the register before whom all wills must be probated. A will is not admissible in -evidence until it has been probated. 3 5 The register,
in passing upon a paper offered for probate, acts as a judge and as such exercises judicial functions within his orbit as prescribed by statute. Every wills act
in this commonwealth has specified that wills be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent witnesses. The Wills Act of 1947 provides:
"Section 4. Witnesses. No will shall be valid unless proved by
35
the oaths or affirmations of two competent witnesses."
Section 4 above quoted is a repetition of the earlier statute. When the
statute states that the will is to be proved, the assumption is that the instrument
31 48 DICK. L. REV, 34 et. seq. (1943).

32 See Gibson's Est., 128 Pa. Super. 44, 193 A. 302 (1937).
3 Citing Hutton on Wills, page 178.
S4 Death As a JurisdictionalFact Before the Register of Wills etc., 53 DICK. L. REV. 108 (1949).
35 Wilson v. VanLeer, 103 Pa. 600 (1883); if; Wilson v. VanLeer, 127 Pa. 371, 17 A. 1097
(1889).
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propounded is a will in form and substance. This determination as already pointed out in the discussion is a matter of law for the court. Therefore, in point of
time the legal determination as to whether the paper propounded is a will must

first be determined. Then follow the proofs of execution, by the testimony of two
87
witnesses.
In all cases the function of the register is to come to a determination as to

whether the paper propounded is in law a will in the light of the decided cases.
In Kauffman's Estate it does not appear from the record available just how much
study the register actually made, but the opinion of Judge Gross in reversing the

register is an excellent exposition of the law on this subject. At another place~s
the present writer has in the discussion
propositions and the sam-e are herewith
who does not have access to the original
1. A will may be written with any

of this general subject deduced certain
repeated for the benefit of any reader
paper:
material and upon any material but the

nature of the materials and the position of the testator at the time of execution will throw considerable light on the testamentary intent.
2. A will may be in any form of language provided testamentary intent can
be construed therefrom.
3. The ascertainment of testamentary intent is a matter of interpretation of
language and a question of law for the Court.
4. Where the language is not clear the Court may be aided in the interpretation by extrinsic evidence, in which case the two witnesses requirement is
not applicable and circumstances disclosed may resolve any doubt existing as to the nature of the instrument.
5. If the Court determines as a matter of law that the evidence for the contestant or proponent would not support a verdict for either as the case
might be, there are no grounds for the granting of an issue d.v.n.
6. If the Court determines that an issue should be granted or that the facts
presented to the Court as the trier of the same raise a doubt, this doubt
must be dispelled by the two witness requirement.
7. If the language of the paper propounded is susceptible of but one meaning, there is no question of interpretation and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible.
8. Where the language of the paper is clear, the subscriber is bound by the
legal intent deduced therefrom except in cases of fraud, accident or
mistake. 89
86 Report of Commission, page 38.
87 See Execution of lVills-47 DICK. L. REv. 65 et seq. (1943).
88 Testamentary Character and Intent, 48 DICK. L. REv. 22 (1943).
89 A will containing no intelligent bequest or devise is void for uncertainty and parol evidence is
not admissible to explain what the testator meant by such an instrument, Kelley v. Kelley, 25 Pa. 460
(1854); Carlin's Est., 36 D. & C. 704 (1939); Douglas' Est., 303 Pa. 227, 154 A. 376 (1931).
Brennan's Est., 324 Pa. 410, 188 A. 160 (1936).

